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ABSTRACT 
CHARITABLE ENDEAVORS OFTEN FACE RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND RELY ON ALTRUISM FOR 
MONETARY DONATIONS NECESSARY TO PURSUE MISSION-DRIVEN OPERATIONS.  
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN HONOR-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEM TO ATTRACT DONATIONS 
ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE SOME PORTION OF THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH FUNDRAISING 
ACTIVITY.  HOWEVER, HONOR-BASED SYSTEMS ARE NOT MONITORED AND, THEREFORE, 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNDERPAYMENT AND THEFT.  THIS STUDY EXAMINES HOW POSTING A 
MESSAGE COMMUNICATING A NEGATIVE INJUNCTIVE NORM AFFECTS CHARITABLE DONATIONS 
RESULTING FROM PROVISION OF A SNACK BOX USING AN HONOR-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEM.  
THE STUDY FINDS THAT PRESENTATION OF AN INJUNCTIVE NORM DISSUADES CONTRIBUTIONS 
FROM DONORS INCLINED TOWARD SLIGHT UNDERPAYMENT BUT DOES NOT DETER GROSS 
UNDERPAYMENT OR THEFT.  THE OVERALL EFFECT IS A DECLINE IN DONATIONS.  THE STUDY 
CONCLUDES BY IDENTIFYING INSIGHTS LIKELY TO IMPROVE THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN HONOR-BASED SNACK BOX INTENDED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 On January 1, 2008, Radiohead famously debuted its album In Rainbows to its website only, 
instructing fans to pay whatever they felt the album was worth.  Years later we know that fewer than half 
of the downloads were accompanied by a payment.i  What is challenging to economists is not that half of 
the album downloads were not accompanied by a payment, rather that nearly half of them were 
accompanied by a payment.  More recently, an established restaurant chain introduced a “pay-what-you-
want” policy intended to make a nutritious bowl of chili available to all — especially to those who needed 
it.  Initial reports suggested that patrons paid a bit more to make the chili available to those unable to pay 
full price.ii  Whether the program is an innovative pricing strategy or a savvy public relations scheme, the 
sustainability of the program ultimately is determined by the willingness of customers to cover the costs.  
Sustainable honor-based payment systems defy economists’ expectations.  Why would anyone pay for 
something if not required to do so?  In reality quite a few people make payment voluntarily in exchange for 
goods and services.  This case study examines voluntary contributions associated with a snack box.  As 
with Radiohead and the bowl of chili, payment is entirely voluntary.  We test different message strategies 
to evoke preferred behavior; specifically, we test message strategies to promote larger voluntary 
contributions. 
 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
Economic theory incorporates key behavioral assumptions to accommodate the use of optimization 
techniques that result in informative and interesting insights.  Two key assumptions of economic theory are 
that more is preferred to less and that consumers seek to maximize utility given an income constraint.  Given 
these simplifying assumptions, modeling altruistic behavior can be challenging if utility is derived solely 
from the consumption of goods and services.  Altruistic behavior necessarily reduces consumption of goods 
and services, yet presumably increases utility and happiness as rational actors choose to forego consumption 
of goods and services in favor of acts of altruism.  The obvious solution is to expand the utility function to 
include arguments that reflect the benefits of altruistic behavior.  In the next section, we review the existing 
literature. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Susan Rose-Ackerman (1996) argues that altruism cannot be understood within the standard 
framework applied by practitioners of the economics discipline.  Her argument is familiar.  Economic 
models based on strict self-interest predict free riding; when the model is extended to its logical conclusion, 
the result is a complete absence of altruistic behavior.  Any honor-based payment system challenges the 
utility maximization model that dominates the science of economics.  After all, why would consumers 
voluntarily contribute more than they must pay when their resources can be used to secure additional utility 
through the purchase of more goods?  The Homo Economicus metaphor portends a highly efficient being 
capable of instantaneous calculations of marginal benefits and costs, assuring maximum utility for any 
known resource constraint.  Homo Economicus accommodates elegant mathematical representations of 
human behavior that generate informative insights.  For this reason, Homo Economicus exists only in 
economic theory, or does he?  A growing body of laboratory experiments suggests that human beings may 
be more like Homo Economicus than some prefer to think. 
While examining the development of self-control in young people, Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) 
present compelling evidence that individuals pursue self-interest.  In an experimental setting, Bucciol and 
Piovesan asked children ages 5 to 15 to report the result of a coin flip.  Although the actual outcome is not 
known, 85 percent of the children reported the financially rewarded outcome.  Given an expectation that 
the actual result of the flip approaches 50 percent, it appears that approximately 70 percent of the children 
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lied for personal gain.  The result was consistent across gender and ages.  In a separate treatment, researchers 
directly asked respondents to tell the truth.  The request inspired less deceit driven by a substantial reduction 
among younger girls, although both boys and girls responded favorably to the request.  Nonetheless, for 
most children the pursuit of self-interest in the form of a small financial payment overwhelms any hesitancy 
to lie. 
Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2012) expand the research design to examine how undergraduate 
college students respond shortly after being treated unfairly.  In this experimental design the individuals 
participate in an allocation game and respond to a survey asking whether they think the outcome of the 
game was fair.  Respondents then flip a coin and report the result.  Approximately half of all respondents 
reporting fair or unfair treatment lie about the coin flip outcome to obtain the financial reward; however, 
the subjects reporting that they were treated unfairly during the allocation intervention were more likely to 
report the financially rewarded outcome than those who report fair treatment.  These studies suggest that 
the pursuit of self-interest is well established in young children as well as college-age students.  Implicit in 
these results is the meager psychic cost associated with lying.  In both experiments the financial reward is 
unremarkable, which suggests the marginal cost of the deception must necessarily be less.  These studies 
suggest we can expect substantial larceny when relying on honor to overcome the pursuit of self-interest. 
Laboratory experiments confirming pursuit of self-interest do not negate observations of generous 
behavior.  Indeed, economic methodology accommodates altruism.  The paradigm dominating economic 
science permits inclusion of additional arguments in the utility function to reflect psychological benefits 
derived internally, social benefits derived externally, and utility resulting from utility accruing to others; 
e.g., the case of parents, who derive greater utility forgoing personal consumption to provide consumption 
opportunities for their children. 
Economists might be well served to recall that self-interest is a simplifying assumption for purposes 
of modeling economic behavior rather than a conclusion derived from the model.  Experimental research 
presents evidence that voluntary contributions are common, so maximizing utility may not necessarily 
entail free-riding.  Indeed, despite the opportunity to contribute nothing, experiments find that participants 
frequently voluntarily contribute 10 to 80 percent of the optimum with most offers in the 40 to 50 percent 
range (Ledyard, 1995). 
Studies reveal that utility-maximizing individuals consider various criteria beyond minimizing cost 
as implied by the utility-maximizing model.  Richard O. Beil and David N. Laband (1996), survey members 
of the American Economic Association (AEA), explored the extent to which members pay the appropriate 
dues.  The AEA offers a variable membership dues schedule based on an individual’s income.  Individuals 
with annual income within the middle bracket are asked to pay 10 dollars more (20 percent) in annual dues 
than the dues assessed the lowest bracket, while individuals in the highest bracket are asked to pay an 
additional 10 dollars, which is 40 percent higher.  Beil and Laband distributed a survey asking AEA 
members to report their income.  Based on 301 responses (63 percent response rate), the authors find that 
only 3 percent of respondents report actual income falling in the lowest range, yet 25 percent of members 
identified themselves in the lowest category when identifying their annual dues obligation.  This disparity 
is remarkable in the sense that it is not a larger proportion.  More than half of AEA members voluntarily 
self-reported income in the highest bracket and thus imposed upon themselves a 40-percent premium.  This 
behavior is not limited to membership organizations.  Steven D. Levitt (2006) analyzes ten years of data 
collected across multiple locations reporting the daily contributions to a locked box for the purchase of 
bagels and donuts to find that the average payment was 90 percent of the posted price.  In the absence of 
any monitoring or penalty, economic theory predicts consumers will pay nothing. 
An interesting thread of economic research explores reasons for cooperating rather than pursuing 
self-interested behavior in situations involving a common resource (Ostrom et al. 1994).  Schluter and 
Vollan (2011) examine how internalized values and norms may influence the decision to snatch flowers.  
Schluter and Vollan interview 57 individuals who just picked flowers and made payment at one of four 
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honor-based flower-picking locations.  The study reports that 14 (24.5 percent) of the 57 respondents paid 
80 percent of the posted amount due.  Four of the respondents paid less than 5 percent.  As with the AEA 
membership and the bagel and donut case studies, what is remarkable to economists is that people choose 
to pay anything at all. 
In each of these studies the willingness to pay likely reflects an individual’s recognition that the 
service will be discontinued in the absence of sufficient profit.  AEA members assign some value to their 
membership in the organization and pay accordingly.  The office workers who benefit from the convenience 
of bagels and donuts available each morning assign value to the service and pay accordingly.  For the office 
workers, payment reflects the purchase of time.  Similarly, access to fresh flowers is desirable to users of 
the service.  In the absence of payment these services vanish.  With this understanding, we might recognize 
the morality underlying the willingness to pay as cooperative rather than altruistic.  Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to expect a norm to arise to enforce the sense of reciprocal cooperation to retain access to the 
service (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Bicchieri, 2006; Sugden, 2004). 
 
COMMUNICATING NORMS 
 Research examines the impact of norms on human behavior (Cialdini, 1993; Zimbardo and Leippe, 
1991).  Studies distinguish two types of norms:  descriptive norms that identify what people do, and 
injunctive norms that reveal approved behavior.  Communicating norms can be done using positive or 
negative wording.  Positively (negatively) framed descriptive norms are prescriptive (proscriptive) in 
nature.  Regardless of the wording, descriptive norms refer to the behavior of others to influence intended 
behavior.  Injunctive norms command certain behavior whether presented positively or negatively (Winter, 
Cialdini, Bator, Rhoads, and Sagarin, 1998). 
 Cialdini, Demaine, Sagarin, Barrett, Rhoads, and Winter (2006) test the effectiveness of positively 
and negatively worded normative messages intended to dissuade theft of wood from the Petrified Forest 
National Park, located in Arizona.  To test the effectiveness of the message, large signs were posted at the 
start of three popular walking paths and pieces of petrified wood were placed along the targeted walking 
paths.  Every two hours the missing pieces of petrified wood were recorded, the inventory of petrified wood 
pieces was replenished, and the message on the sign was changed.  The study presents evidence indicating 
that injunctive normative statements are more effective than descriptive normative statements, and the 
negatively worded version of injunctive statement was associated with the least theft overall.  Although 
there is little difference between the positively worded versions of both statement types, the negatively 
worded descriptive statement was associated with the greatest amount of theft.  This result is not surprising 
because the descriptive message implies that stealing pieces of wood is socially acceptable behavior — 
after all, many people do it.  These findings offer compelling evidence that the wording of a message is an 
important consideration when attempting to convey a behavioral norm. 
 The existing literature reveals that honor-based payment systems can be viable but face challenges 
that may be mitigated by effective communication of social norms.  This case study examines the 
effectiveness of normative statements associated with an honor-based donation system.  We next develop 
a model and present the experimental methodology. 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This study examines how variation in presentation of the message influences honor-based donations 
associated with a snack box.  The collected donations are similar to total revenue as might be collected by 
a profit-seeking firm.  Unlike total revenue of a profit-seeking firm, which is the product of a posted price 
and the quantity sold of each good, total donations are determined by an unspecified donation by the donor 
4
The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 22 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol22/iss1/5
  103 
each time he or she elects to contribute in exchange for a snack.  The honor-based system, therefore, 
presents analytical challenges because donors do not necessarily select a snack in exchange for a donation 
and it is possible to obtain snacks without contributing a donation.  Accordingly, there is no posted price 
acting as a determinant of demand for snacks.  As a result, the quantity of missing snacks is likely to explain 
the dollar value of total donations because donors are likely to select a snack in exchange for the monetary 
contribution.  Reflecting these considerations, we develop the principle econometric model to examine the 
impact of varying the message, Mi, on total donations, D: 
D = β0 + β1Q + β2Ei + β3Mi + ε 
where Q is the total quantity of units removed from the snack tray, E is various measures, i, of the registered 
enrollment, M is the message type, i, and ε represents the error term. 
This specification of the model contains elements of a typical demand function whereby the number 
of buyers is represented by enrollment, Ei, and tastes and preferences enter the model through message type, 
Mi.  Other typical determinants are not included.  For example, the data do not include income information 
or the price of substitute goods, which were available from a coin-operated vending machine.  Vending 
prices did not change during the study period so this determinant of demand is not included in the model.  
More importantly, the model does not include reference to the price of the snacks because units can be 
removed from the snack box without contributing a donation.iii 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The present case study uses data collected during the 2010-2011 academic year at a private Ohio 
university.  Each morning and afternoon a snack box filled with familiar brands of candy, chips, pretzels, a 
toasted pastry product, cookies, water, etc. was placed in the hallway on the second floor of the building 
housing the business college along with an unsecured cup containing two dollars in change.  Total donations 
in excess of costs of goods sold during the year were to be applied to travel costs associated with a student 
group’s participation at the annual American Marketing Association conference.  The product mix was 
adjusted throughout the year in response to revealed preferences, on the demand side, for individual items 
and in response to the rising cost, on the supply side, of items containing chocolate.  The donation cup and 
snack box were not monitored so there was no way to identify who did or did not donate in exchange for 
snacks.  The number of units of each item removed from the box and the amount of donations collected 
were recorded twice daily, at midday and at the end of the day.  Due to the presence of the unsecured cup, 
it was possible that donations for each day part could be negative, reflecting theft in excess of donations.  
Following the recording of removed units from the snack box and the associated donations, the box again 
was stocked with four units of each item, which accommodated a visually pleasing arrangement of different 
snacks without denying sufficient abundance of popular snacks.  Data were collected for a total of 16 
different snacks over the course of the academic year.  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the snack 
items. 
To match enrollment data and message type, the message is modified each quarter.  Levitt (2006) 
finds no effect due to weather conditions so we expect that any observed effect across quarters is related to 
message type or enrollment rather than weather conditions.  During the first quarter (fall) a small text-only 
sign stating, “$.70 each” was placed next to the snack tray.  The sign included no additional wording.  The 
amount was determined based on supply-and-demand conditions.  The acquisition cost of the snack items 
at an area membership warehouse club chain determined the minimum price, while the presence of a coin-
operated vending machine offering a variety of identical and close-substitute snacks located on the second 
floor of the building defined the upper limit.  There were items in the snack box not available in the vending 
machine, and there were items in the vending machine not available in the snack box.  The prices of items 
available from the vending machine but unavailable from the snack tray might exceed or be less than the 
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70 cents.  All items available in the vending machine that were also available in the snack box required 
payment of 75 cents or more.  As noted above, vending machine prices did not change during the study 
period. 
Research contends that combining visual and rhetorical elements effectively communicates 
intended messages (Lester, 2006; Stafford, Spears, and Hsu, 2003).  Accordingly, during the second 
(winter) quarter of the academic year, an 8-and-a-half-by-11-inch color photo of students was positioned 
behind the snack box with the text-only sign.  Under the photo, the students are identified as participating 
at the conference during the previous spring quarter.  For the third quarter, an injunctive normative 
statement was added to the photo and 70-cent suggested donation.  The injunctive normative statement 
read, “Please don’t take snacks without paying; proceeds are used to fund student participation at the 
American Marketing Association Annual Meeting.”iv 
Given the duration of the study, we are unable to control for the effects of financial crisis or the 
recession preceding the data collection.  It is not clear how the study might be affected by the financial 
crisis or the subsequent recession.  Both events might contribute to increased or decreased self-interested 
behavior.  Levitt (2006) presents evidence suggesting that social trauma such as the events of September 
11, 2001, result in an increase in the payment; however, the recession may exacerbate self-interest as a 
survival mechanism during periods of economic distress and contribute to underpayment or theft. 
 
DATA 
The data reflect the donations and the quantity of units removed from a snack box each morning 
and afternoon during the 2010-2011 academic year.  The final data set contains 233 observations. v  
Enrollment data are included to reflect the number of students enrolled in classes in the building each 
weekday.  We distinguish enrollment by floor and by class type (i.e., business and nonbusiness).  The data 
set does not control directly for the presence of staff and faculty.  All staff members are full time and tend 
to be present weekdays during standard business hours, so there is no expected variation during the study 
period.  Faculty maintain consistent schedules during each quarter so variation across quarters is expected 
to closely resemble the more reliable enrollment data collected from the university’s registrar’s office. 
The variables of interest are two dummy variables constructed to represent distinct message types 
examined by this study.  Using the text-only message introduced during the fall quarter as the base case, 
dummy variables are created to identify the change in message type in the winter and spring quarters.  For 
the winter quarter, the expectation is that the inclusion of a visual image of students will encourage an 
increase in total donations as well as larger donations per unit.  For the spring quarter, the expectation is 
that the injunctive normative statement contributes to larger per-unit donations due to reduction in theft.  
The impact on total donations, however, is ambiguous.  Theory predicts that an effective injunctive 
normative statement may curtail theft but the statement may also impact total donations as individuals opt 
to not donate at all rather than to donate less than the suggested amount.  In this case the injunctive 
normative statement imposes a psychic cost that effectively serves as a price increase.  Accordingly, we 
expect the higher effective price to reduce the number of units but not necessarily the total donations, which 
depends on the elasticity of the normative statement.  As discussed earlier, findings reported by previous 
studies suggest that psychic costs may be low and that the negatively worded injunctive normative statement 
will curtail theft. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the statistical analysis.  In 
addition to examining total enrollment in the building, TotalEnroll, separate measures of enrollment are 
created to reflect total enrollment on the first floor, Enroll1, and the second floor, Enroll2.  Similarly, 
variables distinguish the enrollment of business courses, EnrollBiz, and nonbusiness course, EnrollnonBiz.  
Greater distinction is achieved by isolating business and nonbusiness enrollment by location on the first, 
EnrollBiz1 and EnrollnonBiz1, and second floor, EnrollBiz2 and EnrollnonBiz2. 
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 Because no classes were scheduled in the building on Wednesday mornings, there is an opportunity 
to explore indirectly the differences in faculty and student behavior.  The variable Faculty distinguishes 
Wednesday morning observations from all other observations.  The intent is to examine how the relative 
scarcity of students in the building impacts donations.  A positive coefficient estimate for this variable 
indicates that faculty members contribute larger donations and participate in less theft than students on 
average, at least on Wednesday mornings, or some combination of both.  A second variable is computed to 
reflect the number of chocolate snacks removed from the snack box.  The intent is to examine donations by 
a broader category of snack options.  There is no intuitively appealing approach to group the snacks based 
on observable characteristics, with the exception of combining the two chocolate snacks, which were two 
of the three more popular items.  Efforts to distinguish healthy and unhealthy snacks, with the notable 
exception of bottled water, proved unsatisfying, in part, because the snack labels reveal little variation in 
caloric, sodium, or fat content.  More importantly, we have no data linking donor perceptions of healthiness 
to snack items.  Table 3 presents correlations among all variables. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 4 summarizes regression results for multiple specifications of the model using Donations as 
the dependent variable.  The separate specifications of the model reflect different measures of enrollment.  
For all specifications of the model, the adjusted R-squared indicates that nearly 64 percent of the variation 
in Donations is explained by the independent variables in the model.  The F-statistic is statistically 
significant (p=.000) for all specifications of the model. 
For these four specifications of the model, the coefficient estimate for Units is positive, indicating 
that, on average, after controlling for enrollment and the type of message a .50- to .54-cent donation is made 
in exchange for each snack unit removed from the snack box.  Fifty cents represents 71 percent, while 54 
cents represents 77 percent of the recommended .70-cent donation indicated as part of all three messages.  
This finding is consistent with previous research.  It exceeds the 40-to-50-percent range identified by 
Lenyard (1995) yet falls short of the 90 percent identified by Levitt (2006).  The observed discrepancy may 
be explained, in part, by recognizing that office workers likely incur higher opportunity cost associated with 
securing a donut or bagel than college students incur, who may only be in the building for a short period of 
time.  Students arguably have more opportunity to identify substitute snacks compared to the office workers, 
and therefore may be more price sensitive and thus less supportive of the snack box than the office workers 
of the earlier study.  An alternative explanation considers differences in money demand.  Office workers 
from the earlier study may be more inclined to carry cash and coin than the college students of the more 
recent study, who may be more likely to rely on access to some sort of prepaid university meal plan. 
The coefficient estimates for the dummy variable of the photograph of students participating at the 
previous year’s conference are never statistically significant and alternate in sign depending upon the 
measure of enrollment.  The coefficients are negative when measures of enrollment do not distinguish 
business and nonbusiness classes.  In the fall quarter the message offered no indication of the purpose of 
the proceeds, whereas in the winter the message reveals who benefits from the donation.  Whereas we 
expected the photograph to connect the donor and the beneficiaries, the empirical results suggest that the 
greater knowledge of the beneficiaries seems to inspire animosity among those unlikely to benefit from the 
proceeds.  We may have been mistaken to view undergraduate business students as a homogeneous market 
segment.  Recalling the results of Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2012) perhaps identification of these 
particular marketing students as beneficiaries prompted reprisal by those who viewed themselves as treated 
unfairly. 
The coefficient estimates for the dummy variable of a normative statement in combination with the 
photograph are negative and statistically significant at the five-percent level.  This finding suggests that the 
normative statement negatively impacts total donations after controlling for all other variables.  The result 
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deviates from expectations derived from previous research.  At issue is whether the normative statement 
deters theft of snacks, as intended, or whether the statement dissuades donations.  The decline may reflect 
the dissuasion of donations less than the recommended amount due to the donor’s unwillingness to violate 
the norm.   
Nearly all specifications of the model generate coefficient estimates for the enrollment measures 
that are not statistically significant.  The sole exception is model 4, in which the enrollment variables 
distinguish business and nonbusiness enrollment on the first floor and the second floor.  Under this 
specification, the coefficient estimate for the variable reflecting business class enrollment on the second 
floor is negative and statistically significant at the ten-percent level (p = 0.059).  The magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate, although negative, is close to zero (-0.004), so there is insufficient evidence to 
conclude that business students are more likely to donate less or nothing at all in exchange for snacks 
compared to nonbusiness students.  The conclusion would be more reasonable if the coefficient estimate 
for nonbusiness enrollment on the second floor was positive and statistically significant rather than negative 
and not statistically significant.  Moreover, students are not prohibited from enrolling in both business and 
nonbusiness classes.  Of note, the coefficient estimate of the normative statement variable remains negative 
but increases in magnitude under this specification compared to all others.  Inclusion in the regression of 
an interactive variable formed by the product of the normative statement dummy variable and the second 
floor business class enrollment measure does not offer any additional insight so the results are not presented. 
 To explore the faculty impact on total donations, a dummy variable, Faculty, is created isolating 
Wednesday mornings when no classes are scheduled.  In the absence of scheduled classes, faculty and staff 
may be relatively abundant compared to the other nine day parts of the week during which classes are 
scheduled.  The coefficient estimate is consistently negative but never reaches any conventional measure 
of the statistical significance.  As such, this variable offers limited evidence to suggest that faculty may 
decrease total donations. 
A dummy variable combining the two chocolate candy snacks captures the marginal contribution 
of donors choosing chocolate snacks.  The coefficient estimate is consistently negative and never 
statistically significant.  The negative coefficient estimate indicates that with each chocolate snack selected, 
total donations decline approximately $.10.  The sign and magnitude of the coefficient estimates offer 
suggestive evidence that, on average, individuals selecting chocolate snacks tend to negatively impact total 
donations. 
Previous research finds that negative injunctive normative statements deter theft; however, models 
1-4 result in a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the dummy variable indicating 
inclusion of the negative injunctive normative statement.  To examine this finding, we specify separate 
regression models that replace the dependent variable, Donations, with Donations per Unit and Units. 
To examine the impact of the message on the average Donation per Unit we specify four regression 
models employing Donations per Unit as the dependent variable, which requires removal of Units as an 
independent variable.  Theory and previous research predict that inclusion of the normative statement 
reduces theft and, thus, contributes positively to Donation per Unit as the denominator decreases in relation 
to the numerator comprising the ratio.  Table 5 reports the regression results for models 5-8, which employ 
Donations per Unit as the dependent variable.  Due to the removal of Units as an independent variable, the 
adjusted R-squared falls to less than four percent for these models.  Nonetheless, the F-statistic remains 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level.  In all specifications, the coefficient estimate corresponding 
to the normative statement is negative and statistically significant at the 5-percent level.  Regardless of the 
measure of enrollment, Donations per Unit declines between $.08 and $.15.  It appears that the normative 
statement rebuffed donations in greater proportion than it deterred theft. 
To identify potential explanations for the decline in Donations per Unit associated with the 
normative statements, it is helpful to recall that the dependent variable is a ratio.  The ratio can decrease if 
the numerator decreases, the denominator increases, or if a combination of both.  The expectation is that 
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the normative statement will increase Donations per Unit by reducing theft, which would decrease the 
denominator.  The empirical results, however, suggests the presence of some sort of intervening behavior.  
Intuitively, the results suggest that thieves were not deterred.  Instead, the results imply that donors inclined 
to contribute less than the recommended donation chose to refrain from selecting a snack rather than donate 
less than $.70.  As a result, Donations overall decline proportionately more than Units decline while thieves, 
on average, persist in their in their egotistic behavior. 
Some insight regarding the decline in Donations per Unit can be gleaned from the statistically 
significant, negative coefficient estimate of the independent variable Chocolate.  The coefficient estimate 
reflects that Donations per Unit declines by $.03, on average, for each snack containing chocolate that is 
removed from the box.  Whether the selection of a chocolate snack is associated with donations less than 
the recommended contribution or more frequently removed without a donation, the implication that 
chocolate snacks negatively impact donations is supported by this finding. 
To explore the effect of chocolate snacks, Table 5 reports the regression results for models 9-12, 
which reflect the use of Units as the dependent variable.  The adjusted R-squared ranges between .426 and 
.432 and the F-statistic for all four models is statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  Consistent with 
the results for models 1-3 and 5-8, none of the measures of enrollment are statistically significant at 
conventional levels; however, when the measures of enrollment distinguish business students and 
nonbusiness students, the coefficient estimate reflecting inclusion of the visual message is positive and 
statistically significant.  The positive coefficient estimates indicate that the presence of the visual image of 
students attending the conference the previous year inspired removal of more units from the snack tray.  
This finding suggests that the visual image may have attracted more attention than the snack tray and the 
text-only message.  The finding, however, is dependent on the measure of enrollment specified in the model.  
What is interesting is that the coefficient estimates of the normative statement are no longer statistically 
significant — although three of the four remain negative.  This result suggests that the impact of the 
normative statement more likely affected the monetary donation than the decision to remove a snack. 
In summary, the normative statement negatively impacts donations.  Closer examination of the 
impact reveals that not only did the number of units decline but so did the average donation per unit.  The 
implication is that the inclusion of a statement employing a negatively worded injunctive norm may very 
well have discouraged potential donations that fell short of the suggested donation while simultaneously 
failing to repel those possessing the most larcenous proclivities.  The analysis offers potential insight into 
the potential offenders.  First, evidence links underpayment with chocolate snacks.  Second, there is weak 
evidence suggesting that the contribution of faculty members may be negative.  Third, business students, 
especially those on the second floor closest to the snack box, may engage in pre-emptive reprisal for 
perceived mistreatment. 
These findings must be considered in the broader context of the shortcomings of the study.  The 
most glaring shortcomings of the study relate to research design and execution.  This study, after all, 
required timely data collection to ensure comparability across all observations.  Many observations are 
excluded from the analysis due to problems relating to data collection.  Accordingly, the study would benefit 
from a larger dataset reflecting more consistent data collection.  Similarly, to match the empirical analysis 
and economic theory with the research design, we were required to pair the variation in quarterly enrollment 
with the message.  Whereas past studies vary the message more frequently, this study retained the message 
throughout the academic quarter.  This decision addressed the challenge of the fixed location of the honor 
box in an institutional setting in which the same potential donors are present on a regular basis.  Cialdini, 
Demaine, Sagarin, Barrett, Rhoads, and Winter (2006) are able to vary the message throughout the day 
because visitors to the park experience the message only once.  In contrast, in order to isolate the effect of 
the message in this study, the research design required that each message be introduced only once.  Varying 
the message would have contaminated the data because we would not be able to isolate the effect of the 
message that influenced the decision to select a unit and to make a donation. 
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Pairing the message variation with the academic quarter raises questions regarding how the timing 
of the message during the academic year influences donations.  We cannot definitively claim that 
differences observed across the three messages are the result of varying the message, and we must accept 
the possibility that an omitted variable is correlated with the academic calendar.  For example, weather 
variation is highly correlated with the academic calendar; however, we do not include weather variables 
because the data reflects morning or afternoon day parts that cannot be paired with weather data.  Moreover, 
Levitt (2006) finds no effect from weather using ten years of data.  Nonetheless, there may be an effect that 
is highly correlated with the three quarters of the academic calendar. 
Despite these shortcomings, the study provides empirical evidence of the effect of varying the 
message associated with an honor system snack box.  Further research addressing the experimental design 
can be expected to improve the generalizability of the results. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This case study contributes to a small but interesting research area examining the use of honor-
based payment systems.  Whereas earlier studies focus on the voluntary payment, this study examines 
communications alternatives to affect the payment.  The findings inspire more research questions that are 
worthy of examination, especially as nonprofit organizations face greater fundraising challenges.  A 
systematic understanding of how to improve the results of honor-based payment systems may very well 
facilitate greater fundraising success. 
The present study offers three insights when operating an honor-based snack box to attract proceeds 
for a noncommercial purpose.  First, it appears possible to determine an optimal mix of snacks to maximize 
donations in excess of costs.  The key is identifying appropriate snacks to attract generous altruists which 
simultaneously repel pillaging.  The popularity of chocolate snacks encouraged frequent and costly 
replacement of inventory with negative consequences on total donations.  It would appear that frequent 
statistical analysis will assist in identifying snacks attracting donations and those inspiring plunder.  Second, 
less information is a superior message strategy.  It appears that additional information provided by a 
photograph may contribute to segmentation of donors that subsequently fosters animosity toward the 
identified beneficiaries.  Third, inclusion of a negatively worded expression of an injunctive norm may 
work too well and dissuade potential donors.  A “text-only” sign with the suggested donation may be the 
superior strategy when employing an honor-box system for charitable purposes. 
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 TABLE 1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – SNACK BOX CONTENTS 
Snack Total Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Snickers 166 0 4 1.38 1.209 
Reese’s PBC 322 0 4 .71 .923 
Cookies 165 0 4 .71 .876 
Cheetos 130 0 4 .56 .781 
Lays Chips 113 0 4 .48 .777 
Fruitsnack 111 0 4 .48 .866 
ChexMix 94 0 3 .40 .663 
Pop Tart 83 0 3 .36 .655 
Pretzels 72 0 2 .31 .532 
Trail Mix Bar 60 0 3 .26 .536 
Bottle Water 54 0 3 .23 .489 
Animal Cracker 45 0 2 .19 .456 
Sweet & Salty 30 0 2 .13 .384 
NutriBar 17 0 2 .07 .292 
Krunch 30 0 2 .03 .205 
Planters Bar 2 0 1 .01 .092 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics – Regression Model Variables 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
     
Donations 233 0 12.9 3.543 2.0958 
 
Independent 
Variables: 
     
Units 233 1 18 6.32 3.266 
TotalEnroll 233 0 532 305.3262 131.11980 
Enroll1 233 0 254 144.67 58.221 
Enroll2 233 0 371 160.65 105.036 
Enrollbiz 233 0 487 291.8112 127.56678 
Enrollnonbiz 233 0 52 10.7468 18.52143 
Enrollbiz1 233 0 281 139.5322 76.69358 
Enrollbiz2 233 0 272 154.6695 69.83174 
Enrollnonbiz1 233 0 16 4.9185 6.78978 
Enrollnonbiz2 233 0 38 5.7082 13.60593 
Visual 233 0 1 .67 .473 
Normative 233 0 1 .32 .468 
Faculty 233 0 1 .0773 .26757 
Chocolate 233 0 8 2.0944 1.63992 
NonChocolate 233 0 13 4.2232 2.54307 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
N = 233 
Rev Units Rev 
per 
unit 
Visual Norm 
stmt 
Enroll 
total 
Nonbus 
enroll 
Bus 
enroll 
Nonbus 
1floor 
Nonbus 
2floor 
Bus 
1floor 
Bus 
2floor 
Enroll 
1floor 
Enroll 
2floor 
Faculty Choc 
count 
Rev Pearson 
Corr. 
1 .796** .356** -.015 -.172** .080 .057 .128 .101 .043 .127 .086 .040 .078 -.139* .478** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 .000 .000 .818 .008 .222 .385 .050 .123 .514 .053 .193 .547 .234 .034 .000 
Units Pearson 
Corr. 
.796** 1 -.200** .013 -.109 .137* .049 .185** .100 .040 .153* .172** .049 .144* -.191** .643** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000  .002 .840 .096 .037 .456 .005 .130 .542 .019 .009 .459 .028 .003 .000 
Rev 
per unit 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.356** -.200** 1 -.036 -.111 -.039 .011 -.024 .016 -.004 -.007 -.070 -.011 -.043 .045 -.176** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .002  .580 .090 .554 .865 .712 .808 .954 .913 .288 .868 .518 .493 .007 
Visual Pearson 
Corr. 
-.015 .013 -.036 1 .489** -.558** .412** -.271** .515** .298** -.218** -.231** -.367** -.493** -.033 -.148* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.818 .840 .580  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .614 .024 
Norm 
stmt 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.172** -.109 -.111 .489** 1 -.210** -.341** -.130* -.327** -.290** -.221** -.043 -.326** -.081 -.027 -.259** 
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N = 233 
Rev Units Rev 
per 
unit 
Visual Norm 
stmt 
Enroll 
total 
Nonbus 
enroll 
Bus 
enroll 
Nonbus 
1floor 
Nonbus 
2floor 
Bus 
1floor 
Bus 
2floor 
Enroll 
1floor 
Enroll 
2floor 
Faculty Choc 
count 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.008 .096 .090 .000  .001 .000 .047 .000 .000 .001 .511 .000 .217 .678 .000 
Enroll 
total 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.080 .137* -.039 -.558** -.210** 1 -.138* .888** -.174** -.066 .761** .780** .625** .902** -.564** .192** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.222 .037 .554 .000 .001  .035 .000 .008 .316 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 
Nonbus 
enroll 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.057 .049 .011 .412** -.341** -.138* 1 -.047 .765** .938** .212** -.226** .329** -.355** -.123 .058 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.385 .456 .865 .000 .000 .035  .476 .000 .000 .001 .001 .000 .000 .061 .375 
Bus 
enroll 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.128 .185** -.024 -.271** -.130* .888** -.047 1 .052 -.053 .863** .819** .429** .870** -.663** .173** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.050 .005 .712 .000 .047 .000 .476  .432 .423 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .008 
Nonbus 
1floor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.101 .100 .016 .515** -.327** -.174** .765** .052 1 .564** .147* -.035 .145* -.298** -.210** .062 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.123 .130 .808 .000 .000 .008 .000 .432  .000 .025 .596 .027 .000 .001 .347 
Nonbus 
2floor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.043 .040 -.004 .298** -.290** -.066 .938** -.053 .564** 1 .240** -.251** .410** -.310** -.122 .079 
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N = 233 
Rev Units Rev 
per 
unit 
Visual Norm 
stmt 
Enroll 
total 
Nonbus 
enroll 
Bus 
enroll 
Nonbus 
1floor 
Nonbus 
2floor 
Bus 
1floor 
Bus 
2floor 
Enroll 
1floor 
Enroll 
2floor 
Faculty Choc 
count 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.514 .542 .954 .000 .000 .316 .000 .423 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .064 .233 
Bus 
1floor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.127 .153* -.007 -.218** -.221** .761** .212** .863** .147* .240** 1 .495** .411** .722** -.528** .170** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.053 .019 .913 .001 .001 .000 .001 .000 .025 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .010 
Bus 
2floor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.086 .172** -.070 -.231** -.043 .780** -.226** .819** -.035 -.251** .495** 1 .370** .768** -.642** .143* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.193 .009 .288 .000 .511 .000 .001 .000 .596 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .030 
Enroll 
1floor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.040 .049 -.011 -.367** -.326** .625** .329** .429** .145* .410** .411** .370** 1 .226** -.471** .141* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.547 .459 .868 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .027 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .031 
Enroll 
2floor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.078 .144* -.043 -.493** -.081 .902** -.355** .870** -.298** -.310** .722** .768** .226** 1 -.444** .162* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.234 .028 .518 .000 .217 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .013 
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N = 233 
Rev Units Rev 
per 
unit 
Visual Norm 
stmt 
Enroll 
total 
Nonbus 
enroll 
Bus 
enroll 
Nonbus 
1floor 
Nonbus 
2floor 
Bus 
1floor 
Bus 
2floor 
Enroll 
1floor 
Enroll 
2floor 
Faculty Choc 
count 
Faculty Pearson 
Corr. 
-.139* -.191** .045 -.033 -.027 -.564** -.123 -.663** -.210** -.122 -.528** -.642** -.471** -.444** 1 -.105 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.034 .003 .493 .614 .678 .000 .061 .000 .001 .064 .000 .000 .000 .000  .110 
Choc 
count 
Pearson 
Corr. 
.478** .643** -.176** -.148* -.259** .192** .058 .173** .062 .079 .170** .143* .141* .162* -.105 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .007 .024 .000 .003 .375 .008 .347 .233 .010 .030 .031 .013 .110  
 
*  Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level  
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TABLE 4:  REGRESSION RESULTS 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Adj R2 .638 .637 .636 .639 
F-stat 69.284*** 59.127*** 58.991*** 46.629*** 
Dep Var Donations Donations Donations Donations 
Constant 
(s.e.) 
1.007** 
(.507) 
1.026* 
(.550) 
0.695* 
(.404) 
.978** 
(.424) 
Units 
(s.e.) 
0.542*** 
(.034) 
.0541*** 
(.034) 
0.504** 
(.034) 
0.539*** 
(.034) 
Enroll_total 
(s.e.) 
-0.001  
(.001) 
   
Enroll_1f (s.e.)  -0.001 
 (.002) 
  
Enroll_2f (s.e.)  -.001 
 (.001) 
  
Biz_enroll (s.e.)   -0.001 
 (.001) 
 
Nonbiz_enroll 
(s.e.) 
  -0.006 
 (.007) 
 
Biz_1f 
(s.e.) 
   0.001 
 (.001) 
Biz_2f 
(s.e.) 
   -0.004* 
(.002) 
Non biz_1f 
(s.e.) 
   -0.019 
 (.025) 
Non biz_2f 
(s.e.) 
   -0.012 
 (.009) 
Visual 
(s.e.) 
-0.152  
(.273) 
-0.152 
 (.273) 
0.188  
(.297) 
0.375  
(.394) 
Norm Stmt 
(s.e.) 
-0.460** 
(.209) 
-0.465** 
(.218) 
-0.653** 
(.286) 
-0.822** 
(.355) 
Chocolate (s.e.) -0.109 
(.069) 
-0.109 
 (.069) 
-0.112  
(.069) 
-0.108  
(.069) 
Faculty 
(s.e.) 
-0.277  
(.438) 
-0.287 
 (.451) 
-.154 
(.441) 
-0.523 
 (.469) 
 
*** Statistically significant at .01level 
** Statistically significant at .05 level 
* Statistically significant at .10 level 
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TABLE 5:  REGRESSION RESULTS 
Model 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Adj R2 .038 .034 .037 .037 .427 .432 .431 .426 
F-stat 2.89** 2.369** 2.497** 2.127** 35.629*** 30.403*** 30.233*** 22.518*** 
Dep Var 
Donations 
per Unit 
Donations 
per Unit 
Donations 
per Unit 
Donations 
per Unit 
Units Units Units Units 
Constant (s.e.) 
697** 
(.087) 
0.709*** 
(.094) 
0.661*** 
(.069) 
0.079*** 
(.073) 
3.151*** 
(.971) 
3.803*** 
(1.042) 
2.860*** 
(.764) 
2.948*** 
(.809) 
Enroll_total 
(s.e.) 
0.000 
(.001) 
   
.000 
(.002) 
   
Enroll_1f (s.e.)  
0.000 
(.000) 
   
-0.005 
(.004) 
  
Enroll_2f (s.e.)  
.000 
(.000) 
   
0.001 
(.002) 
  
Biz_enroll 
(s.e.) 
  
0.000 
(.000) 
   
-0.018 
(.013) 
 
Nonbiz_enroll 
(s.e.) 
  
-0.001 
(.001) 
   
0.001 
(.002) 
 
Biz_1f 
(s.e.) 
   
0.000 
(.000) 
   
0.001 
(.003) 
Biz_2f 
(s.e.) 
   
0.000 
(.000) 
   
0.000 
(.004) 
Non biz_1f 
(s.e.) 
   
-0.004 
(.004) 
   
-0.028 
(.048) 
Non biz_2f 
(s.e.) 
   
-0.002 
(.002) 
   
-0.020 
(.017) 
Visual 
(s.e.) 
-0.003  
(.048) 
-0.003 
(.048) 
0.045 
(.052) 
0.079 
(.069) 
0.751 
(.533) 
0.739 
(.739) 
1.338** 
(.573) 
1.460* 
(.768) 
Norm Stmt 
(s.e.) 
-0.083** 
(.037) 
-0.087** 
(.038) 
-0.119** 
(.050) 
-0.151** 
(.063) 
0.024 
(.411) 
-0.167 
(.424) 
-0.489 
(.557) 
-0.596 
(696) 
Chocolate (s.e.) 
-0.030*** 
(.009) 
-0.030*** 
(.009) 
-0.031*** 
(.009) 
-0.030*** 
(.009) 
1.287*** 
(.104) 
1.280*** 
(.103) 
1.277*** 
(.103) 
1.281*** 
(.104) 
Faculty 
(s.e.) 
-0.004 
(.007) 
-0.010 
 (.079) 
-.013 
(.077) 
-0.051 
(.083) 
-1.392 
(.971) 
-1.715* 
(.872) 
-1.238 
(.855) 
-1.429 
(.917) 
 
  *** Statistically significant at .01 level  
    ** Statistically significant at .05 level  
      * Statistically significant at .10 level  
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i
 “Radiohead publishers reveal In Rainbows numbers,” by Daniel Kreps, Rolling Stone, October 15, 2008. 
ii
 “Pay what you want for new menu item at St. Louis Bread Co. Cafes,” by Kavita Kumar, St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
March 27, 2013. 
iii
 Specification of an econometric model in which the equivalent of total revenue is a function of the quantity of 
units sold violates the linear independence requirement when the price of the units sold is constant.  In this model, 
however, linear independence is maintained because the individual donations vary. 
iv
 The wording of the injunctive statement follows closely the wording presented by Cialdini (2003) reviewing the 
message used for testing in the Petrified Forest National Park.  The reference statement reads, “Please don’t remove 
the petrified wood from the Park, in order to preserve the natural state of the Petrified Forest.” 
v
 The number of observations for each of the three quarters fall, winter, and spring are: 78, 80, and 75; respectively. 
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